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ABSTRACT
SEMATECH proponents argue that the SEMATECH consortium model represents
future government-industry consortia. This thesis examines the Semiconductor
Manufacturing Technology Initiative (SEMATECH). Analysis ofSEMATECH includes:
(1) its dissection as a consortium and as a government-industry venture; (2) the impact
of SEMATECH on both semiconductor research and development (R&D) and the
American chipmaking industry; and (3) the political implications of SEMATECH.
SEMATECH is funded through the Advanced Research Programs Agency (ARPA).
Federal support of the semiconductor industry via the ARPA seems incompatible with
Department of Defense interests. There are instances when federal support of R&D is
justified. It seems doubtful that the semiconductor industry is one of those instances, but
if it were, SEMATECH would not be the best way to channel government support.
This thesis shows that SEMATECH is not responsible for the turnaround of the
semiconductor industry; that SEMATECH is not an appropriate model for government-
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Critics proclaim the Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology Initiative, better
known as SEMATECH, as the definitive future model of government-industry
consortia. Many have argued that SEMATECH is responsible for the recovery of the
U.S. semiconductor industry. However, SEMATECH is probably not responsible for
the semiconductor industry's turnaround. It could not have had much effect because
it initially focused on the commodity end of the semiconductor businesses, namely the
production of basic memory chips, DRAMs and SRAMs (Dynamic and Static Random
Access Memory). The initial emphasis in these areas made success unlikely because
the United States gave up basic memory production to the Japanese. Attempting to
recover the memory-chip market was impractical. In fact, the recent recovery in the
United States is generally attributed to the proprietary microcomponents and
application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs). Additionally, the timing wasn't quite
right. The turnaround of the American semiconductor industry occurred
coincidentally with the evolution of SEMATECH. The formation of SEMATECH
had little influence or bearing on the recovery of an industry poised for a comeback
after the disastrous 1980s. The semiconductor industry, nonetheless, had a major
influence on the direction and strategy of SEMATECH.
A government-sponsored consortium is inherently unable to help industry get
into profitable niches. This is due to two factors. First is the incentive problem.
Subsidizing business significantly diminishes incentives for change and innovation.
Good analogies are the welfare and health care systems of this country. Second is the
problem of direction. Proponents of SEMATECH claim it to be "hands-off' from
government control. However, when it comes to strategy, the long arm of Uncle Sam
still dictates that certain programs receive attention by earmarking where
SEMATECH dollars are spent. SEMATECH fully follows these suggestions. They
receive significant attention in SEMATECH 's promotional literature, particularly in
areas such as safety and the environment.
This thesis takes an in-depth look at SEMATECH and its effects on the
semiconductor industry of the United States. It looks at SEMATECH as a consortium
and determines that SEMATECH is not a model for future government-industry
consortia. It discusses the effects of SEMATECH on semiconductor industry research
and development (R&D). The thesis finds that federal support may not be necessary
in this industry due to its profit potential and competitiveness. This thesis also
examines the impact of SEMATECH on the semiconductor industry. It finds that not
only does SEMATECH support selected U.S. semiconductor manufacturers, but it
also supports those companies doing business with SEMATECH members through
joint ventures. In the semiconductor business, technology transfer and spillovers of
technology cannot be prevented. Through unavoidable spillovers, SEMATECH
supports foreign chip makers. Finally, the thesis predicts the future of SEMATECH
and its affiliation with the Department of Defense. In particular, it addresses whether
it is the government's or the defense department's responsibility to assure that certain
industries remain within the borders of this country.
The conclusion of this thesis is that SEMATECH is not responsible for the U.S.
semiconductor industry regaining market share; that SEMATECH is not a good model
for future government-industry partnerships; and that federal funding of SEMATECH
should cease.
A. BACKGROUND OF THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
The United States semiconductor industry has experienced significant changes
throughout its 50-year history. Until the early 1980s, American companies were the
undisputed leaders in virtually every field of the electronics industry, especially
semiconductors.
By the early 1980s, the process of globalization had markedly transformed the
semiconductor industry. Over one-third of the world's semiconductor output was sold
across national borders. While Japanese firms claimed as much as 70 percent of the
United States market for memory chips in 1981, American firms remained dominant
in microprocessors and other logic devices. (Ziegler, 1992, pp. 160-163) During the
middle 1980s, the Americans continued to lose significant market share for
semiconductors to Japan. This was especially true in DRAMs and SRAMs.
DRAMs represented the backbone of the semiconductor industry because of
their high-volume, low-defect, low-cost production. Although Americans pioneered
DRAM technology (invented by Intel in 1971), American chip makers saw their
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Figure 1: Annual nominal sales growth in 1992 was 17 percent.
SOURCE: Standard and Poor's Industry Surveys
market share in memory chips overtaken by the Japanese. High initial profit margins
in the DRAM market lead to a worldwide glut in 1985. This caused prices to drop
significantly. Many American firms left the DRAM market all together. At one
point, there were only two United States suppliers, Texas Instruments and Micron
Technology. IBM and AT&T also produced DRAMs, but for internal use only (they
were "captive" producers). This caused a panic within the United States
semiconductor industry. Many industry analysts attributed Japan's success to MITTs
(Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry) formation of the Very Large
Scale Integration (VLSI) consortium. (Katz and Ordover, 1990)
Semiconductor companies moved away from the memory production business
because the worldwide glut transformed these items into low-profit-margin commodity
products. American companies instead focused on proprietary products and creating
market niches because of their interest in the high-profit-margin products.
Application-specific products now account for the largest portion of the United States
semiconductor business (Standard and Poor's Industry Surveys, Jun 93).
Due to allegations of memory-chip dumping and intense lobbying efforts by the
semiconductor industry, American legislators and trade representatives arranged the
1986 Trade Agreement with Japan to aid the chip producers. This five-year
agreement imposed worldwide controls on Japanese-produced semiconductors. The
American semiconductor industry perceived DRAMs as the key "technology driver"
in semiconductor production. The result for the United States was predictably
disastrous; DRAM shortages caused memory chip prices to skyrocket and Japanese
firms earned windfall profits. The results for electronic industries requiring memory
chips, including United States computer manufacturers and consumers, were equally
disastrous. Because of its perceived "success" in protecting the United States
semiconductor industry, the government extended the trade agreement for an
additional five years in 1991. (Lindsey, Feb 92, p. 42)
The U.S. semiconductor industry has recovered its market share in the last two
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Figure 2: The latest report (July 1993) from VLSI Research, Inc., has Japan with 42.5
percent and the US with 47.5 percent share.
SOURCE: VLSI Research, taken from SEMATECH Success.
microcomponents (i.e. microprocessors) and application-specific integrated circuits
(ASICs). These are products that depend more on innovation rather than the
manufacturing process.
B. BACKGROUND OF CONSORTIA
To maintain United States international competitiveness, specifically with Japan,
Congress passed the National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) in 1984. This Act
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Figure 3: These percentages show how the trends of the early eighties have continued.
SOURCE: VLSI Research, taken from SEMATECH Success.
industry work together on pre-competitive research. Japan had encouraged
collaborative R&D ventures since 1961, when it passed the Mining and Industrial
Technological Research Association Law. This law legalized engineering research
associations (ERAs). (Flamm, 1987) The high-technology industries, once dominated
by American leadership, lost several market niches to the Japanese. International
competitiveness and trade deficits with Japan, especially in the high-technology
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Figure 4: These do not include the captive producers IBM, HP and AT&T. Based on
internal sales, IBM would rank fifth.
SOURCE: Standard and Poor's Industry Surveys.
Congress that they must be able to engage in the same type of ventures in order to
compete.
Consortia were common in the United States in the banking and railroad
industries until the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 made them illegal. The NCRA
limits consortia in this country to R&D-related efforts. R&D consortia are different
from joint ventures. R&D consortia members typically compete with one another in
product markets while most joint venture participants do not. Comprised of
8




















Figure 5: The number two through four companies are all subsidiaries of GM-Hughes.
SOURCE: Standard and Poor's Industry Surveys
companies that manufacture similar products, R&D consortia are considered
"horizontal" organizations. Joint ventures are typically "vertical" organizations.
Each member produces a different component of the chain. Additionally: "... an
R&D consortium tends to have a less focused goal because its potential output is
uncertain and it is difficult to get members to agree on specific goals." (Evan and
Oik, Spring 1990, p. 38)
1. Industry/University Cooperative Research Centers (IUCRCs)
Two other types of organizations distinguish themselves form R&D
consortia. First is the Industry/University Cooperative Research Centers (IUCRCs).
IUCRCs are similar to R&D consortia. An IUCRC brings companies together to
fund a research project. Company representatives primarily determine the direction
and conduct of the research and evaluate the center's progress. Universities normally
initiate an IUCRC and receive government funding. In contrast, industry initiates and
totally funds an R&D consortium.
2. Research and Development Limited Partnerships (RDLPs)
An RDLP is an agreement between general and limited partners. The
general partner oversees the conduct of the research and receives the funding. The
limited partners provide capital but have limited liability and no role in the
partnership's management. RDLPs tend to focus more on later stages of innovation
and have a short duration (two or three years). R&D consortia complement both
IUCRCs, which conduct primarily basic research, and RDLPs, which undertake
mostly commercial research. (Evan and Oik, Spring 1990) Also, R&D consortia
involve the collaboration of competitors.
3. Types of R&D Consortia
R&D consortia can be divided into two main types by structure. The first
is the freestanding body where research is conducted in-house. An example is the
Microelectronic and Computer-Technology Corporation (MCC). The second type of
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consortium serves as an administrative body that coordinates research either at
universities or at member company sites, e.g., the Semiconductor Research
Corporation (SRC).
4. Reasons for Joining Consortia
The principal reasons for joining a consortium are (1) to achieve
economies of scale, (2) to share innovation risks, (3) to set standards for a new
technology, (4) to share complementary knowledge, and (5) to help protect "leaky
technology" from being appropriated by companies not sharing in the research efforts.
(Gates, discussion with author) Companies view R&D consortium membership as
risky because proprietary interests might inadvertently be compromised. There is also
uncertainty over whether a company will be as successful as some of its competitors
in exploiting R&D findings. Some potential member companies may believe the
returns are not worth the effort. Because of such concerns, forming of this new type
of R&D consortium involves risk. But R&D consortia are attractive because they
potentially allow consortia members to leap ahead of or quickly catch up to foreign
competition.
5. Consortia Criteria
William Evan and Paul Oik listed seven generic problems in organizing




(3) Recruiting New Members
(4) Making Decisions
(5) Resolving Legal Issues
(6) Understanding Membership Turnover
(7) Evaluating and Producing Products
a. Recruiting Personnel
Research consortia need especially qualified personnel. Employees
are recruited from two general sources: member companies and outside sources.
Sending its own employees to conduct research is the most effective way to transfer
knowledge back to the member company. In addition, these employees help to
represent their company's interests in the consortium. Also, using members'
employees helps a consortium establish a competent staff quickly. On the negative
side, a company with its own internal R&D program is not likely to send its top
personnel. Therefore, the quality of personnel might be compromised.
b. Obtaining Resources
Consortia receive money and technical knowledge from member
companies. Most consortia recognize that members have differing financial resources
and degrees of interest in the consortium. Therefore, they permit varying levels of
membership, targeting involvement to select projects, or other flexible membership
options.
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c. Recruiting New Members
Recruiting new members is necessary either to replace members who
have left the consortium or to enable the consortium to grow. Generally, recruiting
members does not depend on informing companies about the consortium's
accomplishments. Instead, recruiting requires either convincing companies of the
advantages of membership or expanding the scope of research to appeal to a broader
audience.
d. Making Decisions
Because of the varying interests of consortium members, decision-
making in this environment can be difficult. Most consortia have a board of directors
with a voice in setting overall policies and direction, though the composition of those
boards may vary. Some boards look like state representation in the House of
Representatives; votes depend on the company's monetary commitment to the
consortium. Alternatively, the board may look like state representation in the
Senate, with each company having an equal vote. In addition to the board, there may
be committees to oversee technical direction. The common thread among all
consortia is that the decision-making processes elicit inputs from all members, but
tend to favor those who have the most direct interests or a greater investment in the
organization.
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e. Resolving Legal Issues
The potential for antitrust violations and the need for regulatory
approval for innovative products has made top consortium managers cognizant of the
legal issues involved. NCRA does not completely exempt consortia from antitrust
regulation. Consortia either have an in-house counsel or contract with a law firm to
monitor its activities. These lawyers attend board meetings and may terminate
discussions that, in their judgment, might inadvertently reveal trade secrets.
/. Understanding Membership Turnover
A consortium loses resources when a company departs the
organization. There are two general reasons for terminating membership:
disagreement over consortium operations or unrelated external factors. Disagreements
may include dissatisfaction with the consortium's productivity, direction, or
membership costs. Unrelated external factors could include a change of corporate
strategy or management (e.g., a member company is acquired by a firm that does not
want to continue membership).
g. Evaluating and Producing Products
Consortium managers emphasize that disseminating results to
members is critical to maintaining good relations. Otherwise, individual members
may fear they are not getting a fair return on their investment. Evidence of progress
reduces members' concerns. This is best accomplished by producing tangible,
money-making products or ideas from which member companies can benefit. For a
14
consortium to be successful, it must maintain active involvement by members to
justify their inputs and to transfer technology back to the member. (Evan and Oik,
Spring 1990, pp. 37-45)
C. BACKGROUND OF THREE CONSORTIA
This section describes three consortia for comparison.
1. VLSI
The Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) consortium was formed in 1976
and disbanded in 1979. Many regard VLSI as one of the most successful Japanese
cooperative ventures. It is discussed here because it was reported to be the Japanese
model from which SEMATECH was formed.
Japan's recent success in the semiconductor industry stems in large measure
from a combination of government-backed loans and research subsidies, as well
as a pooling of technical and scientific talent to promote efficient R&D. (Evan
and Oik, Spring 1990, p. 38)
Sponsored by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Mm), VLSI was to
develop advanced semiconductor technology to help Japanese firms compete
effectively with fourth generation IBM computers. VLSI's membership included
Fujitsu, NEC, Hitachi, Mitsubishi, and Toshiba. Each member assigned some of its
research employees to the project. Researchers from Mill's Electro-Technical
Laboratory (ETL) also participated. The VLSI Engineering Research Association was
financed, like most ERAs, under the hojokin formula. The government provided 40
to 60 percent of the funds as interest-free conditional loans. These loans are repaid







































Figure 6: The basic breakdown of the VLSI Organization.
SOURCE: Katz, M.L. and J.A. Ordover, 174.
p. 78) The VLSI group was chartered with developing the generic technology for
manufacturing random-access-memory (RAM) chips capable of storing 64K bytes of
data. The VLSI consortium was a high-technology cooperative catch-up program. It
was successful because it had a clear concise mission with a definitive objective.
Its success in delivering the technology to manufacture 64K integrated circuits
and in advancing Japanese capability in 256K technology can be attributed, to a
large extent, to the clear-cut R&D tasks facing the consortium members. This
clear definition of tasks also implied that the R&D goals facing the funis
supplying inputs to the device makers were clear, permitting better coordination
along the vertical chain. Some... believe that the equipment and material
suppliers who worked under contract with the device makers in the VLSI
16
consortium have been the main beneficiaries of the progTam. (Katz and
Ordover, 1990, p. 176)
The VLSI consortium experienced significant start-up difficulties. Each
participating firm feared losing proprietary knowledge that it possessed at the
project's inception. Each firm was also engaged in separate collaborative R&D with
other consortium' members. Some firms also had links to U.S. computer makers.
(Flamm, 1987)
The organizational structure focused on close cooperation on pre-
competitive research to ensure that participants benefitted from strong spillovers and
technology transfers in generic areas. A spillover is an externality and benefit of
R&D. Spillovers can be one of two types: competitive spillovers and technological
spillovers. "Even with strong intellectual property protection, R&D investment by
one firm may affect other firms through competition in the R&D market and in the
product market." (Katz and Ordover, 1990, p. 150) Technological spillovers result
primarily from private R&D investment and include patent protection. "Even though
one firm may be said to have won the patent race, rival firms may benefit from the
product or process that the winner has developed." (Katz and Ordover, 1990, p. 150)
In the VLSI project, most of the applied work was conducted in the
private labs of the participating members, to ensure the propriety of new discoveries
(although these patents were assigned to the Engineering Research Association in
order to qualify for public subsidy). (Flamm, 1987) The traditional form of
cooperation entailed only a limited interchange of research personnel and highly
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controlled flows of information. Each cooperative laboratory was assigned a distinct
research objective and was led by a representative from a different participating
company; in other words, there was a "NEC" lab, a "Hitachi" lab, et cetera. As a
result, only 16 percent of the patents generated by the VLSI consortium were filed
jointly by researchers from different companies or by MTTI. (Katz and Ordover,
1990, p. 178) Researchers returned to their firms once VLSI disbanded, ensuring
maximum technology transfer to the participants.
One reason for VLSI's success is that many of the companies involved had
participated in private joint-ventures prior to VLSI. They also anticipated future
cooperation in joint ventures or consortia sponsored by Mill. Another important
factor was the role MITI officials played in guiding the project from its inception.
MTTI coordinated VLSI from beginning to end.
The fact that MTTI could be expected to be involved in many research projects
in which the VLSI-member companies would be participating created additional
incentive for firms to act cooperatively with MTTI and with each other. The
expectation of future subsidies from the ministry together with the potential
threat of exclusion from future projects and thus a loss of important R&D
subsidies provided a countervailing force to whatever reluctance firms may have
had in participating in joint research. The VLSI was not simply a cooperative
venture among private firms-government money and incentives appear to have
played an energizing role in its formation and ultimate success... (T)he visible
success of the consortium in boosting the competitiveness of the Japanese
signaled that closer collaboration in large scale consorti(a) is feasible without
generating significant free-rider problems and uncontrolled spillovers of core
proprietary information. Thus, the consortium has played a significant
demonstration role for subsequent collaborative endeavors. (Katz and Ordover,
1990, p. 180)
The VLSI project is said to only have advanced the speed of R&D without producing
many breakthroughs. Flamm also points out that the large number of patent
18
applications resulting from the VLSI association-more than 1000—as a measure of
success, although it is not clear how many of those patents have commercial
applications.
2. JESSI
Launched in 1989, the Joint European Sub-micron Silicon Initiative
(JESSI) was set up in the European Community to ensure that European
semiconductor companies gained access to leading-edge chip technology. The
European governments have launched numerous past projects to enable Europe to
compete more effectively with American and Japanese companies. These include:
Eureka, Esprit, Prestel, Teletext, Informatique, Antiope, Airbus Industrie, Alvey, the
Silicon Structures Project and several others. JESSI was a frantic effort by the
European Community to secure independence from United States and Japanese
semiconductor firms. Foreign firms accounted for over 90 percent of the European
semiconductor market. (Blau, J., March-April 1992, p. 3) JESSI was designed with
the belief that government needed to plan and subsidize the floundering semiconductor
industry. (Gilder, 1989, p. 320)
The European Community pays between 40 and 60 percent of JESSI'
s
budget. The budget was more than $400 million in 1992. (Lineback, J.R., 29 March
1993, p. 2) JESSI concentrates on "flagship" projects that include: high definition
television (HDTV), digital audio broadcasting, digital cellular telephones, and
advanced Integrated Services Digital Networks (ISDN). Smaller projects are grouped
into wider-focused "clusters." They also have specific objectives, such as the 0.35
19
micron chip and the 64 mega-byte memory chip. To date, both specific projects are
behind schedule. They are not expected to yield results until 1996.
Research at JESSI is conducted by the individual companies and is shared
through licensing and patent agreements. JESSI is divided into four subprograms:
(1) memory technology projects in process development and manufacturing
technology;
(2) basic and long-term research;
(3) equipment and materials; and
(4) applications.
Consortium officials admit that JESSI currently has too few projects in the computer
field. They hope to correct this.
JESSI has eight member companies, but is dominated by three companies:
Philips, SGS-Thomson, and Siemens. These large electronic firms report minuscule
profits in the production of semiconductors, although Philips is the tenth largest
semiconductor producer in the world, accounting for 3.1 percent of the world market.
(Blau, April-March 1992, p. 4) JESSI does not allow foreign participation, although
IBM-Europe is a member. Joint partnerships between member and non-member firms
has been a touchy subject. One company, ICL pic of Great Britain, was expelled
after being acquired by Fujitsu Corporation of Japan.
JESSI makes little use of the Continent's academic institutions, but hopes
to increase their participation in the future. (Bernier, 19 Oct 1992, p. 4) According
to John Blau of Research-Technology Management, JESSI' s major problems are
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directly related to Europe's fragmented semiconductor customer base, "which has
saddled the national chip makers with low-volume production and high marketing
costs." (Blau, March-April 1992, p. 4)
Although JESSI has not registered any significant accomplishments to
date, it has managed to lower research costs and to pool European resources through
the Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International (SEMI) organization.
JESSI has been virtually ineffective to date, and its existence further entrenches the
European semiconductor industry into a virtually hopeless "catch-up" situation with
world producers, most notably the Japanese for memory chips and the United States
for processors. T.J. Rogers, commenting on JESSI, stated:
Amazingly, we still have "experts" who want us to emulate Europe's alphabet
soup of technology consortiums such as JESSI, their equivalent of the U.S. chip
consortium SEMATECH. JESSI showered billions on the European
semiconductor industry. It also "rationalized" the industry by allocating certain
market segments to various companies. Siemens became the DRAM company
for Europe~and has since gone out of the business. Philips became the SRAM
company for Europe~and has since gone out of that business...Today, there is
no European chip industry or computer industry to speak of—thanks to the role
of government programs like JESSI. (Rogers, 25 March 1993)
The industrial policies of Europe tend to favor less private enterprise and more
government involvement, especially in key industries such as semiconductors.
3. SEMATECH
The Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology consortium (SEMATECH)
was organized in 1987 as a U.S. response to a growing Japanese dominance of the
worldwide markets for commodity chips (specifically DRAM, Dynamic Random
Access Memory, and SRAM, Static Random Access Memory). Its mission, as of
21
January 1993, is "to create fundamental change in manufacturing technology and the
domestic infrastructure to provide U.S. semiconductor companies the continuing
capability to be world-class suppliers." {SEMATECH Success, 1992 Annual Report)
SEMATECH is a Department of Defense/industry partnership consisting of the
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA, formally DARPA) and eleven of the
largest U.S. semiconductor manufacturers.
a. SEMATECH Members
Member companies in the SEMATECH consortia include:
(1) Advanced Micro Devices, Incorporated
(2) American Telephone and Telegraph Company





(8) National Semiconductor Corporation
(9) NCR Corporation (owned by AT&T)
(10) Rockwell International Corporation
(11) Texas Instruments Incorporated
Three of the founding companies have left SEMATECH: Harris Corporation, Micron
Technology Incorporated, and LSI Logic Corporation. Their departures resulted in
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Figure 7: The SEMATECH Organization as it was originally envisioned. Robert Noyce
was the founding CEO and ARPA was formally DARPA.
SOURCE: Katz and Ordover, 183.
b. Semi/SEMATECH
The consortium also has links with manufacturers of semiconductor
materials and equipment through Semi/SEMATECH. Semi/SEMATECH was
organized in 1987 as an independent chapter of the Semiconductor Equipment and
Material International (Semi). Its membership is restricted to U.S. firms. This
organization and the goals of SEMATECH reflect that it was formed to boost the
supply sector. SEMATECH hoped for technological spillovers created by vertical
relationships (vertical being the entire scope of the manufacturing process, from raw
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materials to the finished product) among producers of basic semiconductor-
manufacturing equipment and makers of semiconductors themselves.
c. SEMATECH Funding
SEMATECH is supported by public and private funds.
SEMATECH' s operating budget is $200 million per year. ARPA contributes
approximately $100 million per year. Member firms collectively provide the other
$100 million. Individual member-contributions range from a $1 million minimum to
a $15 million maximum. More specifically, membership fees equal one percent of
the member's annual semiconductor sales up to the $15 million maximum. (U.S.
GAO, Jul 1992, p 17) In addition, each member must agree to join the
Semiconductor Research Corporation (SRC). SRC's dues range from $65,000 to $2.4
million, depending on company size. There is also a one-time sign-up fee of
$62,000. (Rice, 1 May 1988,
p. 8)
Member companies contribute personnel to SEMATECH 's research
and administrative staff. The salaries and expenses for these personnel are deducted
from the member company's annual dues. SEMATECH also employs close to two-
hundred of its own personnel for research and support. This accounts for just over 50





Figure 8: Each company has a minimum of $1.2 billion in revenues.
SOURCE: Standard and Poor's Industry Surveys.
d. SEMATECH Thrust Areas
SEMATECH's research focuses on "Thrust Areas." In other words,
they channel funding into specific areas of interest. These include {SEMATECH
Success, 1992 Annual Report):
• Contamination-Free Manufacturing
• Lithography
• Manufacturing Methods (Including Environmental Projects)
• Process Architecture and Characterization
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Impact of SEMATECH Dues
Comparison of
% R&D vs Total R&D
AMD DEC IBM Motorola Rockwell NCR
Figure 9: Based on $15 million dues divided by company's devoting 8.5 percent of total
revenues for R&D.
SOURCE: Figures are taken from Standard and Poor's Industry Surveys.
• University and National Laboratories Programs
• Manufacturing Systems Development (CIM)
• Modeling and Strategic Integration
• Multilevel Metal and Etch
• Total Quality
26
SEMATECH believes that these thrust areas will have the greatest impact for
producing the critical equipment and methods that its members require to regain world
leadership in semiconductor manufacturing.
e. SEMATECH Original Objectives
SEMATECH originally established a five-year, three-phased program.
SEMATECH members would achieve manufacturing parity with Japan upon the
completion of phase two. They would reclaim world semiconductor manufacturing
leadership by the end of 1992 upon the completion of phase three. Each phase called
for smaller and smaller chip features on larger and larger wafers. Phase One,
completed in 1989, developed integrated circuits with 0.8 micron features on 5-inch
silicon wafers. Phase Two, completed in 1990, developed integrated circuits with 0.5
micron features on 6-inch silicon wafers. Phase Three, completed at the end of 1992,
developed integrated circuits with 0.35 micron features on 8-inch silicon wafers. In
addition, SEMATECH established eight main objectives in 1990. These objectives
were developed after the "Three Phase" program, and are intended to incorporate
both the "Thrust Areas" and a combination of technical aspects, the semiconductor
infrastructure, and market penetration. Listed in SEMATECH Success, 1992 Annual
Report, they included:
Objective 1: Develop key process modules for member companies to integrate
into proprietary process flows and products. Establish a baseline integrated
process.
Objective 2: Reduce member risk by delivering manufacturing processes and
equipment modules for use in future equipment decisions.
27
Objective 3: Develop at least one qualified, viable U.S. supplier for each key
equipment module and manufacturing system.
Objective 4: Develop long-term strategic alliances with selected suppbers to
develop the required capability on the required time schedule.
Objective 5: Provide preferential availability of all funded equipment, systems,
materials, supplies, and chemicals to the member companies.
Objective 6: Drive standards and specifications for open architecture, computer-
integrated manufacturing systems, including a generic cell controller.
Objective 7: Continue to provide a forum for open communication. Ensure
timely information transfer.
Objective 8: Establish collaborative centers of manufacturing science at selected
universities and national laboratories.
These objectives have been met, though it appears they may not have been very
ambitious. "SEMATECH was able to borrow technology from private companies and
reproduce manufacturing results that other private companies had achieved years
before~and do it with taxpayers' money." (Lindsey, p. 43) Specifically,
SEMATECH purchased technology and equipment from IBM and AT&T to provide
Manufacturing Demonstration Vehicles (64K SRAM and 4MB DRAM), for example,
to build its semiconductor fabrication plant in Austin. The "fab" was built in 1988 to
produce the 0.8-micron chips. {SEMATECH Milestones) These chips were already
being produced by member companies as well as competitors.
/. SEMATECH's Current Mission
SEMATECH established a new mission for its 1993 to 1997 R&D
program. The mission is to "create fundamental change in manufacturing technology
and the domestic infrastructure to provide U.S. semiconductor companies with the
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capability to be world-class suppliers." (SEMATECH Success, 1992 Annual Report)
This mission will be measured by technology phases four and five. Phase Four's goal
is to produce integrated circuits with 0.25 micron features on 8-inch wafers by the
end of 1994. Phase Five's goal is to produce integrated circuits with 0.18 micron
features on 10-inch wafers. To reach these goals, SEMATECH hopes to accomplish
the following objectives (listed in SEMATECH Success, 1992 Annual Report):
Objective 1: Provide unit processes and generic manufacturing methods for
members to integrate into their proprietary process flows and products.
Objective 2: Ensure that there is a viable supplier infrastructure capable of
meeting the members' requirements for key equipment modules, materials, and
manufacturing systems.
Objective 3: Reduce sensitivity of cost to manufacturing volume.
Objective 4: Provide programmable factory systems capable of responding to
process changes with first-pass success.
Objective 5: Cooperate with the Semiconductor Research Corporation, ARPA,
and national laboratories to develop a research and educational infrastructure
necessary to sustain U.S. leadership in semiconductor technology.
Objective 6: Maintain open forums for effective communications, collaboration,
and consensus building with the SEMATECH community.
According to GAO, ARPA believes that this plan has clearly stated technical
objectives that are broken down into measurable criteria and linked to SEMATECH
thrust areas. These objectives, like those written in 1990, all appear relatively
subjective. Therefore, measuring their success depends more on opinion than fact.
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g. SEMATECH Accomplishments
Since SEMATECH let its first contract in 1989, it has signed
approximately 100 joint development and improvement contracts with equipment
suppliers and member companies. SEMATECH has numerous accomplishments since
its inception. In its own words, these include:
• the ability to construct cost-effective, world-class fabrication facilities capable of
manufacturing 0.35 micron technology;
• generating 15 patents and 36 pending patent applications, helping enact more
than 300 industry standards, participating in 110 equipment improvement and
joint development projects and publishing more than 1,100 technical documents;
• providing a forum for communication within the semiconductor industry. By
sharing pre-competitive data, SEMATECH claims to have shifted the industry's
culture from a competitive, arms-length relationship between semiconductor
manufacturers and their suppliers toward a culture that establishes long-term
relationships between semiconductor manufacturers and their suppliers;
• improving strategic planning within the industry by developing a consensus
among member companies on performance requirements and timing for next-
generation equipment;
• developing common methods for evaluating, improving, and qualifying
equipment and associated software;
• beginning to develop industry-wide standards for computer-integrated
manufacturing (CIM) technology. (SEMATECH Accomplishments, Dec 1992, p.
38)
h. SEMATECH and the Department of Defense
The biggest selling points for the Silicon Valley lobbyists in getting
SEMATECH funded were the decline of U.S. leadership in the semiconductor














Figure 10: Note the percentage of consumption for the US military.
SOURCE: Standard and Poor's Industry Surveys.
other words, the decline of defense industries. To improve the defense industrial base
and possibly acknowledge their funding source, SEMATECH has developed the
ARPA/SEMATECH Synergy. In SEMATECH Accomplishments, SEMATECH makes
the following assertions:
• that the Department of Defense must procure R&D to maintain U.S.
technological superiority;
• that SEMATECH gives ARPA the ability to leverage industry dollars and
expertise to ensure U.S. technological superiority in semiconductor
manufacturing for critically needed defense electronics;
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• that SEMATECH is a good investment: for every $1 SEMATECH uses to fund
a project, the semiconductor manufacturing equipment and materials industry
contributes $3 in total R&D spending.
These assertions are not substantiated. For SEMATECH to prove its "investment"
assertion would be impressive if it were true. SEMATECH then goes on to show
what influence each member company has on the defense industry (as if SEMATECH
were responsible). It states:
SEMATECH and the high-technology it supports are crucial to America's
national security. SEMATECH is working to develop or improve several key
semiconductor factory tools which in turn are used to make integrated circuits
for advanced U.S. weapons systems. (SEMATECH Success, 1992 Annual
Report, p. 12)
SEMATECH points out what weapons systems these integrated circuits support,
leaving the reader thinking that SEMATECH is responsible for those weapon systems.
SEMATECH Accomplishments lists "defense critical technologies" and details how
many "electronic part types" various weapon systems include. Some examples of
these are:
Microelectronic Circuits: the production and development of ultrasmall
integrated electronic devices for high-speed computers, sensitive receivers and
auto control.
Software Engineering: the general maintenance and enhancement of affordable
and reliable software in a timely fashion.
High Performance Computing: computing systems having 1000-fold
improvement in computation capability and 100-fold improvement in
communication capability by 1996.
Simulations and Modeling: visualization of complex processes and the testing of
concepts and designs without building physical replicas.
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Electronic Component Part Types Per Weapon System:
Tomahawk Cruise Missile—1,270 Electronic Part Types
Abrams MIA Tank--2,500 Electronic Part Types
Apache Helicopter—4,600 Electronic Part Types
F-lll Bomber-8,900 Electronic Part Types
F/A-18 Hornet Attack Plane-- 14,400 Electronic Part Types
F-16 Fighter-17,000 Electronic Part Types
SEMATECH continues with vague breakdowns of many other weapon systems,
highlighting the dependence on electronics. SEMATECH also lists the different
defense-systems that member companies contribute, specifically Motorola, Intel,
National Semiconductor, AMD, Rockwell, and Texas Instruments.
By discussing the crucial role of semiconductors in advanced defense
uses, SEMATECH's 1992 Annual Report leaves the casual reader with the impression
that SEMATECH is responsible for the development of these semiconductors. But
SEMATECH had nothing to do with their development. These weapons were
developed long before SEMATECH even existed. In fact, these defense contributions
were achieved by the SEMATECH-member companies themselves. These
"accomplishments" appear more as simple statements defining areas of which most
people are only vaguely familiar. To one familiar with this field few points of praise
actually resemble any true SEMATECH accomplishments.
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H. ANALYSIS AND EVIDENCE
This chapter evaluates SEMATECH as a consortium and as an organization. It
compares SEMATECH to the Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) consortium upon
which SEMATECH was modeled. This chapter concludes by comparing
SEMATECH to Europe's Joint European Sub-micron Silicon Initiative (JESSI).
A. SEMATECH AS A CONSORTIUM MODEL
SEMATECH has been hailed as the model for future government-industry
consortia. This section evaluates SEMATECH as a consortium and as a government-
industry model.
1. Evaluation of SEMATECH as a Consortium Model
Based on the definitions of Evan and Oik discussed earlier, SEMATECH
is not a consortium. Rather, it is a conglomeration of an R&D Limited Partnership
(RDLP), an Industry/University Cooperative Research Center (IUCRC), a joint
venture, and a consortium. SEMATECH resembles a consortium because it involves
horizontal companies. In other words, its membership consists of industry
competitors with common interests in several product markets. However, a
consortium is initiated and totally funded by industry. SEMATECH was initiated by
industry with skillful Washington lobbying, but it is only half funded by industry. At
the same time, SEMATECH funded Semi/SEMATECH (Semiconductor Equipment
and Materials International), an organization that is comprised of 138 American
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suppliers. [NOTE: The SEMI organization was in place before the formation of
SEMATECH.] This exhibits the verticality of joint ventures. SEMATECH has
established more than 51 Joint Development and Equipment Improvement Projects
with more than 45 companies. {SEMATECH Strategic Overview, Dec 1991, p. 1-15)
SEMATECH has also initiated the SEMATECH Centers of Excellence (SCOEs) and
Participating Institutions. These are essentially research departments at more than 30
colleges and universities. They receive SEMATECH dollars for specific research
projects giving SEMATECH the appearance of an IUCRC instead of a consortium.
When the subject of funding is examined, SEMATECH looks more like an RDLP.
Uncle Sam is the limited partner, providing over half of its total cumulative funding.
The following paragraphs will analyze SEMATECH as a consortium by
detailing how SEMATECH management addresses the seven generic problems
common to R&D consortia.
a. Recruiting Personnel
SEMATECH is comprised of research engineers and administrators
"on loan" from member companies, in addition to its own internal work force. Each
company handles its employees' tour with SEMATECH differently. Those people
from each member company are typically on assignment to SEMATECH for two to
three years, and serve in positions such as executive vice president of operations,
division director, program director, project director, or individual contributor (on a
project). Figure 11 shows a breakdown of member companies personnel contributions






Figure 11: SEMATECH 1992 Employees by Company. Note that Intel employees
outnumbered TI by more than two to one.
SOURCE: Cuiell, J. and R McCausUnd, 1.
The only way to effectively ensure thorough transfer of technology is through
personnel working on and familiar with the specific project. Intel has about 50
percent more employees than Texas Instruments, which is the member company with
the second largest number of employees in SEMATECH. This is attributed to Intel's
emphasis on R&D and its strong support for SEMATECH. (Alcott) It is also
interesting that member companies continue to pay the salaries of their own
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employees. These payments are deducted from the member companies' dues. This
means that member companies do not actually pay the salaries.
b. Obtaining Resources
Obtaining resources was discussed in the background of SEMATECH,
specifically, the "SEMATECH Funding" section.
c. Recruiting New Members
SEMATECH has been unsuccessful in attracting new members. This
is especially troublesome with the loss of Harris, Micron, and LSI Logic. Rockwell
and IBM have also considered leaving the consortium. (Lineback and Dunn, 16 Nov
1992, p. 7) New members must not only pay the required dues for both
SEMATECH and SRC, but they must also pay back dues, dating to the inception of
SEMATECH. (U.S. GAO, Jul 1992, p. 17) This makes new membership cost-
prohibitive even for the healthiest of companies. It also makes it less and less likely
that new members will join because back dues will only cumulate.
SEMATECH' s membership policies discriminate against many of the companies
that are leading America's comeback. SEMATECH 's advertised dues of one
percent of sales actually have a $1 million per year minimum. That means a
$20 million company pays dues equal to 5 percent of its sales—perhaps all of its
profits and five times the dues for a company with revenues of more than $100
million. What's more, SEMATECH's dues top out at $15 million per year,
which means that companies with sales of more than $1.5 billion receive a dues
discount. Thus, a SEMATECH member with $3 billion in sales pays dues
equal to one-half of one percent of its sales~or one-tenth the rate of a $20
million company. SEMATECH's dues structure deliberately discriminates
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Figure 12: These amounts are determined by assuming 8.5 percent of revenues are
invested in R&D.
SOURCE: Standard and Poor's Industry Surveys
.
All of SEMATECH 's current members have annual revenues of
greater than $1 billion. Membership is the most troubling indicator that SEMATECH
is not popular among semiconductor manufacturers. SEMATECH Communications
manager Michele Higdon stated that SEMATECH member companies do not desire
new membership. She said that SEMATECH is convinced that the current members
best determine the R&D needs and requirements for the entire semiconductor
industry. (Higdon, 15 Jul 1993)
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d. Decision-making
Decision-making at SEMATECH is broken into four main areas:
(J) Board ofDirectors. The governing body, comprised of member
company representatives, sets the mission, high level objectives, and strategy. Each
member company has one seat on this board and it is typically chaired by a company
CEO or a very senior executive.
(2) Executive Technical Advisory Board. The team of member
company executives that provides continuing advice on the technology strategy and
program selection. These personnel are assigned on a permanent basis and are
typically "technology transfer" experts.
(3) Focused Advisory Boards. The member company managers that
provide technical advice within a focused technical regime such as "Furnace and
Implant" or "Multi Level Metal and Etch."
(4) Project Advisory Boards. The member company user
representatives that provide specific project needs and project feedback. (Pankratz, 19
May 1993)
Decisions are made on an equitable basis, one vote per member,
with the Board of Directors and the Executive Technical Advisory Board. On the
Focused Advisory Boards and the Project Advisory Boards, a member company's
voting weight is based on its annual dues. From a practical side, the more employees
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that have a member-company allegiance, the more decisions that will be made in the
parent company's favor.
e. Legal Issues
SEMATECH employs its own attorneys and hires law firms to litigate
specific cases. All patent applications, patent infringement cases, and other legal
issues are handled by these lawyers.
/. Reason for Membership Turnover
Harris Coiporation, the latest company to leave SEMATECH, said
the "company's needs weren't aligned with SEMATECH's research priorities."
("Harris Leaves SEMATECH," 6 Jan 1993, p. 3C) Harris' biggest customer is DoD.
DoD requires rugged semiconductor devices in its weapon systems. These devices do
not typify the newest in semiconductor technology. Rather, these devices are proven,
effective, and reliable semiconductors used in military systems. Harris is more
interested in Total Productive Maintenance (TPM) and improving manufacturing
methods. Harris could not persuade SEMATECH to implement a TPM program.
Harris left the consortium because it desired to put its SEMATECH dues into its own
internal TPM program. (Blanc, 18 Jul 1993)
LSI Logic was the first member company to defect. Its departure
coincided with an in-company restructuring. LSI's Director of Technology Transfer,
David Sanders, stated that his company had different objectives than SEMATECH and
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Figure 13: This shows Harris, a former SEMATECH member, as the leading military
semiconductor producer.
SOURCE: US GAO, Federal Research, SEMATECH '« Technological Progress and Proposed RAD Program.
SEMATECH and felt that it was a worthwhile and successful endeavor, just not for
his company. (Sanders, 13 April 1993) Micron cited similar reasons for its
departure. [NOTE: Micron and LSI Logic were the little guys in the consortium,
both with revenues around $500 million.] Three reasons for termination are apparent
with these three companies: dissatisfaction with the direction of the consortium, high
price of membership, and changes of corporate strategies. Membership turnover does
not exist at SEMATECH, only membership exodus.
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g. Evaluating and Producing Products
Because SEMATECH emphasizes pre-competitive research, it does
not produce commercial products. It does have production capabilities in its Austin,
Texas plant. These facilities, however, are used to evaluate production processes, not
to produce actual semiconductors. (SEMATECH Strategic Overview) While
SEMATECH emphasizes production, there are no money-making products and
relatively few ideas that member companies can use to their direct benefit. Evan and
Oik described "product production" as one of the keys to measuring a consortium's
success. This criterion, then, discredits SEMATECH as a consortium.
2. Analysis of SEMATECH Objectives
This section will discuss the eight original SEMATECH objectives and its
six follow-on objectives. Objectives are used by organizations to set goals and
expectations. These goals and expectations will later be used as a benchmark to
measure their performance and determine their success. One point about "objectives"
must be made. In many government organizations that depend on their overseer to
insure their continued funding, Byron's Law of Objectives applies. Byron's Law is:
Never create objectives that are not easily attained. In fact, it's better to
understate your true expectations so that when you surpass your objectives, you
appear to be more successful than originally hoped. In that light, each objective
will be restated and analyzed.
a. Original Objectives
SEMATECH established eight original objectives in 1990.
SEMATECH claims to have successfully accomplished all eight objectives.
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Objective 1: Develop key process modules for member companies to integrate
into proprietary process flows and products. Establish a baseline integrated
process.
This objective was accomplished by estabbshing a baseline process
with 0.8-micron, 0.65-micron, 0.5-micron, and 0.35-micron
manufacturing capabilities. It appears that SEMATECH was more
interested in the production technology than the actual process.
SEMATECH supports this by stating that it concentrated more on the
proprietary aspect and product development than on improving the
process flows (SEMATECH Accomplishments). Harris Corporation
left the consortium because SEMATECH fell short of its expectations
in this area. The problem with this objective is that the "key
modules" were somewhat subjective, which all but assured their
completion.
Objective 2: Reduce member risk by delivering manufacturing processes and
equipment modules for use in future equipment decisions.
SEMATECH accomplished this objective by developing three
programs: (1) a single industry standard tool qualification; (2) a
repetitive improvement program; and (3) a Cost of Ownership
simulation software program. Each of these programs is designed to
decrease the uncertainties associated with major business decisions. A
"single industry tool qualification standard" requires more than the
limited membership of SEMATECH for that standard to be observed
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industry wide. Additionally, a tool guideline can become an industry
standard without the existence of SEMATECH. It requires a
commitment to that standard from the entire industry, not just
SEMATECH members. The "repetitive improvement program"
seems to be very similar to the TPM (Total Productive Maintenance)
program advocated by Harris Corporation. Yet, Harris left the
consortium citing the lack of commitment from SEMATECH to TPM
as one of its reasons for departure from the consortium. The Cost of
Ownership program is based on the "make or buy" decisions that
many industries must consider. Although Gordon Alcott, a
Technology Transfer Manager for Intel, cited the Cost of Ownership
software to be very effective and one that his firm uses as an aid in
decision-making (Alcott), such software is hardly leading edge and
can easily be developed by a consultant for well under $100,000.
Member risk, however, can only be reduced in major business
decisions with proper management. These programs may aid
management in decision-making, but themselves, do not reduce risk.
Objective 3: Develop at least one qualified, viable U.S. supplier for each key
equipment module and manufacturing system.
SEMATECH claims to have accomplished this. This is a lofty
objective with definitive criteria. The problem: who determined the
list of key equipment modules and manufacturing systems? This
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objective apparently does not include major suppliers. For example,
the epoxy resin used to house semiconductors is not produced
domestically and therefore must not be "key." (Carlton) Also, if
SEMATECH supports a firm satisfying a specific demand, will that
firm continue to survive without SEMATECH?
Objective 4: Develop long-term strategic alliances with selected suppliers to
develop the required capability on the required time schedule.
SEMATECH claims to have accomplished this by pointing out that
they have initiated over 51 Joint Development and Equipment
Improvement Projects with 45 companies. It also cites the Total
Quality program instituted at SEMATECH. Again, the problem:
who determined the list of selected suppliers and its required time
schedule, and what is the required capability?
Objective 5: Provide preferential availability of all funded equipment, systems,
materials, supplies, and chemicals to the member companies.
SEMATECH says this objective is accomplished by giving its
members the right of first acceptance of products and systems
developed at SEMATECH. However, this objective could be used as
a criticism of SEMATECH. T.J. Rogers said, "SEMATECH uses
kick-back agreements to reduce the financial contributions of its
members..." As an example he cites that SEMATECH-member
companies purchase test equipment for SEMATECH that they would
have likely acquired for themselves.
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Objective 6: Drive standards and specifications for open architecture, computer-
integrated manufacturing systems, including a generic cell controller.
This has been claimed as a success. The problem here is that this
objective can easily fit into many other the high-tech industries.
Other industries resolve standards either through a superior product,
ones that establishes a standard itself (e.g., the personal computer
operating system-MS-DOS), or through industry-agreed-upon
protocols (e.g., the ISO standards for telecommunications). Open
architecture is the trend throughout both the hardware and software
fields of the computer and electronic industries. A computer company
has the incentive to meet current industry standards to ensure that its
products are compatible with both present and future systems. An
organization such as SEMATECH is not needed to "drive standards
and specifications for open architecture," or endorse "computer-
integrated manufacturing systems." Also, this objective cannot be
quantifiably measured. A further question: how does SEMATECH
institute industry standards and under what authority?
Objective 7: Continue to provide a forum for open communication. Ensure
timely information transfer.
This is another subjective criterion with no possible way to prove or
disprove its accomplishment. SEMATECH presumably supports open
communications among members, although that may be in question
with all the litigation and law suits that member companies file against
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each other for alleged patent and copyright infringements. But what
about communications among the rest of the semiconductor industry?
Objective 8: Establish collaborative centers of manufacturing science at selected
universities and national laboratories.
This was accomplished by naming 31 universities and national
laboratories throughout the United States as SEMATECH Centers of
Excellence (SCOE). SEMATECH directs many of their basic
research projects to the SCOEs. One problem, it seems that this
objective duplicates the mission for the Semiconductor Research
Corporation (SRC).
b. Revised Objectives
New objectives were established in 1991 to set the stage for
SEMATECH through 1997. Each new objective lists measurable criteria for
evaluating success in each applicable "Thrust Area." From SEMATECH's viewpoint,
the great thing about these new objectives is that many have already been
accomplished. They must already be accomplished seeing that the original objectives
were successfully completed.
Objective 1: Provide unit processes and generic manufacturing methods for
members to integrate into their proprietary process flows and products.
This is the same as "Original" Objective 1.
Objective 2: Ensure that there is a viable supplier infrastructure capable of
meeting the members requirements for key equipment modules, materials, and
manufacturing systems.
This is the same as "Original" Objective 3.
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Objective 3: Reduce sensitivity of cost to manufacturing volume.
In this objective, SEMATECH hopes to "hold semiconductor
manufacturing cost of ownership constant at current levels in spite of
increasing process sophistication and complexity." It also hopes to
"reduce sensitivity of cost of ownership to factory capacity (penalty
for 10X less capacity must drop from 50 percent to 25 percent)."
{SEMATECH Strategic Overview, 1991, pp. 3-5,6) This objective
defies economies of volume. Firms generally look for ways to exploit
economies of volume rather than mitigate them. How can volume in
a manufacturing process not affect the cost of the product? This
objective is baffling. Why is this objective even desirable? If
"reducing sensitivity of cost to manufacturing volume" were achieved,
it would slow progress.
Objective 4: Provide programmable factory systems capable of responding to
process changes with first-pass success.
This is similar to Objective 1 , but it hones in on the Computer
Integrated Manufacturing (CIM) program with which SEMATECH
has been working with since its inception.
Objective 5: Cooperate with the Semiconductor Research Corporation, ARPA,
and national laboratories to develop a research and educational infrastructure
necessary to sustain United States leadership in semiconductor technology.
This is the same as "Original" Objective 8. One confusing thing in
this criterion is "Cooperate with...ARPA." The measurable criterion
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is to have "at least one ARPA program tool on the roadmap in 1994."
{SEMATECH Strategic Overview, 1991, p. 3-8) There are currently
no specific defense-related programs at SEMATECH. It's confusing
because ARPA is the government sponsor of SEMATECH.
Objective 6: Maintain open forums for effective communications, collaboration,
and consensus building with the SEMATECH community.
This is the same as "Original" Objective 7.
It appears that these objectives were designed more for public
relations than to define SEMATECH 's goals and missions.
3. VLSI and SEMATECH
SEMATECH was modeled after the highly successful Japanese Very
Large Scale Integration (VLSI) consortium. This section will compare the two
consortia based on both the seven generic criteria discussed earlier and on other
factors.
ARPA sponsors SEMATECH (formally DARPA, but with "Defense"
eliminated to appear more user friendly to commercial applications). As such,
ARPA's function is similar to the role that MITI played with VLSI. Similar to VLSI,
SEMATECH was initiated to enable the American semiconductor industry to compete
effectively with the Japanese dominated memory-chip market. VLSI was initiated
with specific objectives and upon their accomplishment was disbanded. SEMATECH
was also initiated with specific objectives, but those objectives have been frequently
changed and there seems to be no desire to dissolve the organization.
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a. Recruiting Personnel
Recruiting personnel is similar for both consortia in that both use a
combination of company and consortium personnel.
b. Obtaining Resources
Total funding for VLSI was $600.9 million (in 1993 dollars based on
the producer price index) with the Japanese government providing $281.6 million.
(Katz and Ordover, 1990, p. 176) Funding to date (from FY 1987 through FY 1993)
for SEMATECH is $1.5 billion with the U.S. government contributing $757.0
million. The Japanese government funding was an interest-free loan; U.S.
government funding for SEMATECH is an outright subsidy. The following table
(figure 14) shows a comparison of VLSI and SEMATECH funding based in 1993
dollars.
VLSI's physical resources also differ tremendously from
SEMATECH' s. SEMATECH created its own $100 million facility where the
majority of R&D is conducted. The SEMATECH factory accounts for approximately
56 percent of expenditures. Only 37 percent of its costs can be directly linked to
R&D. (U.S. GAO, Jul 1992, p. 29) VLSI conducted all R&D at member company's
research labs, thereby devoting virtually all funding earmarked for VLSI to applied
research and development.
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VLSI and SEMATECH FUNDING |
VLSI
Total Outlay (millions) Government Contribution (millions)
Actual 1993 Dollars Actual 1993 Dollars
Year (PPI) (CPD (PPI) (CPD
1976 $ 80.0 $ 167.0 $ 195.6 $ 37.5 $ 78.3 $ 91.7
1977 $ 80.0 $ 157.1 $ 183.7 $ 37.5 $ 73.6 $ 86.1
1978 $ 80.0 $ 145.7 $ 170.7 $ 37.5 $ 68.3 $ 80.0
1979 $ 80.0 $ 131.1 $ 153.4 $ 37.5 $ 61.4 $ 71.9
TOTAL $320.0 $600.9 $ 703.4 $ 150.0 $281.6 $ 329.7
SEMATECH
Total Outlay (millions) Government Contribution (millions)
Actual 1993 Dollars Actual 1993 Dollars
Year (PPD (CPI) (PPI) (CPD
1987 $ 200.0 $ 238.5 $ 253.9 $ 100.0 $119.3 $ 126.9
1988 $ 200.0 $ 232.8 $ 243.8 $ 100.0 $ 116.4 $ 121.9
1989 $ 200.0 $ 221.3 $ 232.6 $ 100.0 $ 110.6 $116.3
1990 $ 200.0 $ 210.9 $ 220.7 $ 100.0 $ 105.4 $ 110.3
1991 $ 200.0 $ 206.6 $ 211.7 $ 100.0 $ 103.3 $ 105.9
1992 $ 200.0 $ 204.0 $ 205.6 $ 100.0 $ 102.0 $ 102.8
1993 $ 200.0 $ 200.0 $ 200.0 $ 100.0 $ 100.0 $ 100.0
TOTAL $1,400.0 $1,514.1 $1,568.3 $700.0 $ 757.0 $784.1
*Aaul* tit tfproamiu moagu u> Ike cue of SEMATECH; "PPI* it Ike Producer Priee lntki for fimthod (oadt; *CPI* it Ike Contamcr Price Index.
This table shows the dollar amounts the Japanese and the American governments
contributed to VLSI and SEMATECH respectively for comparison. What the
table does not show, however, is how much of that money was devoted to actual
R&D. It is this author's opinion that the VLSI investment represented more
R&D dollars than does SEMATECH. According to GAO, only 37 percent of




c. Recruiting New Members
Membership was not a factor with VLSI. It had only five members.
All members were fully committed for the entire project and they never intended to
expand that membership. Membership was initially not an issue with SEMATECH.
But after three members have left and the consortium eyes funding and support into
the 21st century, one would expect attracting new members to be a priority.
According to SEMATECH Communications Manager, Michele Higdon, new
members would be welcome, but SEMATECH is not actively seeking nor does it
necessarily desire new members. (Higdon)
d. Decision-making
VLSI was successful in part because it's objectives were limited and
well defined in terms of technical goals, funding, and lifespan. Thus, the need for
on-going decisions was limited. In contrast, SEMATECH has modified its technical
goals and life-span. This significantly complicates SEMATECH's decision-making
process.
The decision-making process for the two consortia is also quite
different. Mill divided the objectives among the participating companies and each
company collaborated with researchers from MITI's Electro-Technical Laboratory
(ETL). Mm also assigned specific tasks to the participating labs. The Japanese
company working on specific projects and tasks had the most influence on their
outcome, as VLSI was much less hierarchically structured. SEMATECH has several
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more layers than VLSI with both the House and Senate models of decision-making.
Therefore, SEMATECH-member companies have less influence on the direction of
SEMATECH than the Japanese companies had with VLSI.
SEMATECH cannot be judged successful due to its decaying
membership, changing objectives, and quest for indefinite continuation. SEMATECH
may have been modeled after VLSI upon its inception, but there is no resemblance to
the Japanese consortium today.
4. JESSI and SEMATECH
JESSI is hailed as the last resort for the European Community to be able
to effectively compete in the worldwide semiconductor market. JESSI is designed as
a colossal defi Europeen in response to the American challenge. (Gilder, 1989, p.
320) JESSI's structure is similar to SEMATECH, with two major differences. First,
JESSI smothers its members, preventing them from participating in joint ventures
with companies outside JESSI. The rationale is to avoid spillovers and unauthorized
technology transfers. SEMATECH, although wary of joint ventures, does not
discourage these practices. Second, JESSI's budget is more than twice that of
SEMATECH. This increases the burden on JESSI member companies. They must
account for $200 million in dues, or an average of $25 million each. This means that
considerable potential internal R&D funding is lost. Finally, despite its focus on
generic or pre-competitive research, JESSI has yet to be affiliated with academia. On
the other hand, SEMATECH contributes significantly to academic institutions through
research grants.
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The results for the European semiconductor manufacturers are obvious.
They're playing an impossible catch-up game. The innovations required to create
high profit-margin products cannot occur when their emphasis is on generic or pre-
competitive research. This is not as drastic for SEMATECH, primarily because
SEMATECH member companies are very large and their SEMATECH contributions
have little effect on their internal R&D.
JESSI, like SEMATECH, is seeking an "indefinite'' extension beyond its
1996 expiration date. Research goals are now "refocused" on potential high-growth
technologies. Additionally, there is a significant effort to increase cooperation
between SEMATECH and JESSI. (Lineback and Dunn, 16 Nov 92, p. 7)
In terms of success and effectiveness, SEMATECH appears more along
the lines of JESSI. It has very little to show for the immense amount of tax dollars
spent. Cooperation between two organizations with limited success may not be the
best approach for the 21st century.
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m. JUSTIFICATION FOR GOVERNMENT SUPPORT
This chapter examines government subsidies and their effects on research and
development. It looks at the market imperfections associated with R&D. It discusses
the semiconductor industry, and the public welfare that is realized in both R&D and
industry. It concludes with rules of thumb for government intervention.
A. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
The U.S. government provides significant R&D funding in this country.
American R&D is traditionally either commercial, defense, or federal non-defense.
Defense and R&D programs for other federal interests are public sector technologies.
Several justifications for government intervention in R&D have been suggested.
They are: (1) non-appropriability, (2) preservation of specialized providers, and
(3) indivisibility.
1. Non-Appropriability
Appropriability imperfections occur when a firm is unable to take
advantage of all the benefits accruing from its R&D projects. If imitation is easy or
the development can be manipulated by another firm, it is not appropriate for a firm
to invest in R&D in that area. This is one of the justifications given for federal
participation in basic R&D. Another example is in the case of generic research. A
firm conducting generic research may appropriate only a small portion of its efforts,
if any. Therefore, non-appropriability is a potentially good justification for
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government intervention in R&D. Two additional factors that often arise in
discussions of appropriability are uncertainty and time.
a. Uncertainty
Uncertainty is internal to the organization when it concerns the
project's technical outcome; it is external to the organization when it concerns the
future market in which the technology must compete. Internal and external
uncertainties influence a firm's investment decisions and the corresponding
development strategies. Internal uncertainties are ones that a company may be able to
control. They can be reduced by investing in research to create additional knowledge
and information from which calculated decisions can be made. Some additional
information can be accrued through engineering and marketing studies, while other
data accumulates as the project advances through the research and development cycle.
"At each stage of the R&D process, decision makers must consider the tradeoffs
between investments in R&D and the value of the knowledge created in order to
determine whether to continue the R&D project and at what level." (Gates, 1988, p.
28)
On the other had, external uncertainties are those generally beyond
the firm's control. External uncertainties are normally weighed and evaluated through
informed judgements and probability theory. Uncertainty in R&D is also often
accompanied by high risk. This is especially true in "high-technology" projects.
Many in industry justify federal participation in high-risk R&D because the
government can more readily absorb R&D failures. (Gates, 1988, p. 28) The
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potential non-appropriability of the R&D also contributes to uncertainty. But
uncertainty does not contribute by itself to non-appropriability. Uncertainty is always
a factor in R&D.
b. Time
Changes in project duration affect both expected costs and benefits of
R&D. A project may be obsolete when it enters production due to rapid
technological changes or imitation of the product by competing firms. This will
decrease a technology's value of time. Concurrently, demand and market size may
increase over time. "Time-related demand shifts can either increase or decrease a
technology's value; overall, expected benefits generally decrease as time increases."
(Gates, 1988, p. 29) Time can also result in high risk. Benefits from R&D can be
non-appropriable due to time, but this risk will always occur. The "time" issue does
not, in itself, justify government intervention.
2. Preservation of Specialized Providers
Government typically supports industries that have little competition and
that are thought to fulfill a niche important to national security. Many government
officials and politicians think that without this support, that particular industry would
cease and national security might be compromised. The semiconductor industry is a
highly competitive, globally-integrated, high profit-margin industry. Seldom have
chip makers avoided business opportunities simply because those opportunities crossed
lines of demarcation. It is because the semiconductor industry is globally integrated
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that various parts and materials have left American shores. American chip makers
are business people who purchased certain items or services overseas because of
better value to their companies. Therefore, even though some of the products in this
industry are not produced domestically, they are produced and are available to
American industry. Even in the event of war, some producers of these items would
be willing to sell to U.S. firms.
An excellent example of how the American industry responds to products
suddenly becoming unavailable is its reaction to the 4 July 1993 fire of the Sumitomo
Chemical Company in Japan. Sumitomo produced over sixty percent of the world's
epoxy resin supply used in semiconductor housing. Dupont was the remaining
domestic producer of that resin when it shut down production in 1989. Since the fire,
several American companies have re-considered producing epoxy resin. Meanwhile,
as their inventories dwindle, the industry (led by Motorola and AMD) is looking at
alternative housing methods (i.e., ceramics) and exploring alternative chip packaging
means to preclude other supply problems. (Carlton, J.) (Gross, N.)
3. Indivisibility
"Indivisibilities arise where it is impossible or prohibitively expensive to
divide a large R&D project into smaller tasks that can be funded by smaller individual
firms." (Carpenter, 1990, p. 8) Smaller firms in the semiconductor industry are
generally unable to commit the capital necessary to conduct the R&D required for the
next generation of computer chips. One argument for SEMATECH is that large scale
R&D cannot even be properly funded by the larger companies. That argument for
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SEMATECH is weak. If the returns for large scale investment are appropriable, then
the project will be funded. Besides, the amount of capital devoted to R&D at
SEMATECH pales in comparison to the R&D capital of many of its members (e.g.
,
$5.2 billion for IBM verses less than $200 million for SEMATECH).
B. COMMERCIAL VERSUS PUBLIC TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
Commercial technology development differs from basic R&D and public sector
technology development. Industry has choices as to which commercial technology
they invest in based on profit potential in the private market. Often, public sector
technologies do not. Commercial technologies must be technically and economically
competitive to be attractive to the consumer. Another difference is that independent
R&D initiatives are likely to be significant, particularly as technologies approach
commercialization. Federally supported commercial R&D projects are apt to displace
or duplicate many private efforts. (Gates, 1988, pp. 27-28)
Assume that the semiconductor industry has changed little historically. In this
case, the basic justification for government-subsidized R&D is the overall public good
that results from technical breakthroughs in basic research and development. Private
investment in basic R&D in these areas tends to be unattractive. The rate of return
for significant investment into basic R&D does not justify its expense for private
firms. A private firm typically conducts R&D in areas that may result in new
products. In these cases the tendency is to keep results internal to the company,
hoping for the greatest return for its R&D investment.
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The type of research conducted by private firms depends on the appropriability
of that research. The appropriability for basic research conducted by individual
companies is difficult to measure and perceived to be low. Results from basic R&D
are quickly disseminated throughout the scientific community. In addition, these
results generally have applications that exceed the scope of any single firm or
industry. Consistent with this view, SEMATECH should focus on basic or generic
R&D where the results are dificult to appropriate.
C. TYPES OF FEDERAL SUPPORT




through direct funding of an organization designed to conduct specific R&D;
2. through tax credits for incremental research and experimentation to cover the
costs of collaborative research;
3. through procurement of specified products or systems; and
4. through research grants to individual firms for specified projects.
Tax credits and procurement tend to be less intrusive and usually allow free market
incentives to function better. Richard Nelson broke down the subsidization issue and
distinguished among four kinds of government R&D support programs (Nelson, 1982,
p. 458):
1 those associated with public procurement or other well-defined public
objectives,
2. those that involve an extension of support for scientific basic research to
advance generic technological knowledge,
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3. those that are aimed at meeting reasonably well defined clientele demands,
and
4. those that attempt to support "winners" in commercial competition.
Critics have argued that many of the government sponsored R&D programs
have been inordinately expensive and wasteful. This is typically the case for category
four, programs that support winners in commercial competition. Contributions to the
advancement of civilian technology created by defense and space programs are
"spillovers" from well-defined public objectives to commercial products. Certainly
commercialization was not the principal intent of these programs. The advance of
civilian technology was the central purpose of government R&D support programs in
agriculture and basic biomedical research. This research typically addresses generic
technical knowledge. The rate of return on the public investment in R&D for
agriculture undoubtedly has been very high. But the rate of return in other programs,
such as the supersonic transport, the solar energy industry, and AMTRAK, among
others, have been disasters and are regarded as failures. Projects like these create the
perception that government R&D is wasteful. (Nelson, 1982, p. 470; Gates, 1988)
There is a problem with government subsidization of commercial R&D.
Product related R&D in the semiconductor industry is appropriable. The chip-making
business is highly competitive, globally integrated, and responds to the free market.
Semiconductors represent the "tip of the spear" concerning the technical revolution.
The only chance for a semiconductor firm to remain profitable is through innovations
and process improvements. Innovation requires individual commitment to research
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and development programs. Hence, the incentive to invest in R&D in the
semiconductor industry is naturally very high due to the dependence on innovation to
ensure high-profit-margin products.
The federal government substantially supports basic and public-sector-related,
semiconductor R&D. "Federal agencies have been involved in the U.S.
semiconductor industry since its inception and have contributed to its
competitiveness." (United States Congress, Sep 87, p. 3) The Department of
Energy's National Laboratories have research programs on semiconductor materials
and processing, as do the National Science Foundation and the National Bureau of
Standards. Besides funding through ARPA, each military agency also supports
research in the semiconductor industry. So the question remains, does the
semiconductor industry require further federal support to remain competitive? Does
government support of the commercial semiconductor industry reduce the chip
makers' incentive to invest in basic R&D?
Until the formation of SEMATECH, it was argued that the federal funding of
semiconductor R&D created a gap in research not covered by semiconductor firms or
their equipment suppliers. The government emphasized basic research and R&D
benefitting the military, nuclear power and other public sectors; semiconductor
companies concentrated their R&D on solving current problems or providing
background for their next manufacturing facility. (United States Congress, Sep 87, p.
5) SEMATECH was envisioned to create an environment where the government and
62
major semiconductor firms combine their funding to close the gap between federally
sponsored research and the research of the private firms.
SEMATECH proponents argue that independent private investment in these
research areas is cost prohibitive. But, they agree, if a firm has to only invest a
minimal amount in a collaborative effort and can reap all the benefits of that
organization, it will be financially attractive. To justify federal support,
SEMATECH's research results must be non-appropriable. However, SEMATECH's
exclusionary membership policies and licensing agreements suggest that these results
are appropriable. Furthermore, international diffusion of SEMATECH's research is
likely to occur first through international joint ventures with SEMATECH members.
This represents an "intentional" spillover; it is not an "unintentional" spillover
expected from basic research. For these reasons, government support for
SEMATECH is not justified. Federal support of R&D does not necessarily increase
U.S. competitiveness; in fact, it may decrease the incentive for independently funded
basic R&D.
D. INDUSTRY
The government has had a history of supporting targeted industries, from
agriculture to railroads. (Blister) While there may be some success stories, several
blunders have wasted large amounts of public funds. The basic problem with
allocating federal funds to support a specific industry is that the process does not
respond to market requirements. It responds more to bureaucratic empire building
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and political payoffs. Don Valentine, founding venture capitalist and a director of
Apple computer and currently a director of Cisco Systems, argues against government
support and a free market: "The world of technology is complex, fast changing,
unstructured, and thrives best when individuals are left alone to be different, creative,
and disobedient." (Rogers, 25 March 1993)
Government support is generally associated with government regulations and
control. Many private companies prefer to conduct their business within the limits of
the law without government support and its associated restrictions. T.J. Rogers
argues that it is only through free markets that companies adjust to market conditions
to ensure that they remain competitive. Government support inhibits these necessary
adjustments, sometimes to the point that the industry or company is effectively
eliminated.
Government officials often hope, when determining the best way to support
industries, that their involvement preserves normal market incentives. But if federal
support reduces a company's incentive to fund areas which the company would have
funded anyway, government involvement is misdirected. Normal market incentives
must be maintained.
E. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION RULES OF THUMB
Summing up government support for the semiconductor industry, Brink
Lindsey's "DRAM SCAM" article appropriately points out that SEMATECH only
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reaffirms some rules of thumb regarding direct and indirect government support
(Lindsey, Feb 1992, p. 48):
Rule number one: Whenever government decides to step in and "help" an
industry, the effect, whether intentional or not, is usually to preserve the status
quo and stifle beneficial change. This isn't because bureaucrats are stupid; it's
because of the nature of politics. Government naturally favors interests with
political clout, which means interests that are well-organized and well-funded.
Accordingly, the political contest between industry giants—with their trade
associations and Washington offices and PR offensives—and the entrepreneurial
start-ups that are trying to upend them will always be a skewed one.
Rule number two: "Strategic" industries are a dime a dozen. Every decent
lobbyist can come up with several plausible-sounding reasons why the industry
he represents is a linchpin of American economic strength and must therefore be
preserved at all costs. The only real validation of such claims, though, is
ongoing wealth-creation and growth. And if an industry meets this definition of
"strategic," it doesn't need government help.
Rule number three: Patriotism is the last refuge of scoundrels. National
security may indeed take precedence over economic considerations, but
arguments that the free market is undermining us militarily should be assessed
skeptically. In most cases, what is at stake is the security of special interests,
not the nation.
Rule number four: Nothing lasts forever, but "temporary" federal assistance
comes close. Whenever government does intervene in an industry, there is
almost irresistible pressure for it to remain there. Not only do beneficiaries
within the industry become addicted to government support, but bureaucrats
become convinced that the industry can't run without them.
Government support of the semiconductor industry through SEMATECH illustrates
these rules of thumb.
65
IV. SEMATECH AND ITS IMPACT
This chapter discusses SEMATECH 's impact since its inception and its role in
the recent recovery of the semiconductor industry. It also discusses the unavoidable
effects of technology spillovers and the relationships of SEMATECH member
companies with foreign firms through joint ventures. This chapter concludes with
some thoughts on the future of SEMATECH.
A. RECOVERY OF THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
Concerning the R&D process, SEMATECH is far too young to have yet had an
impact on the current success of American chip producers. The amount of time it
takes for strides in the research laboratories to reach the market place is at least three
years. (Okimoto, 1984, p. 81) SEMATECH was initially funded for five years,
ending in 1992. The funding justification anticipated that industry improvements
would be realized after completing the fifth year with the third "phase. " (United
States Congress, Sep 87, p. 40) The industry turnaround actually began in 1989,
without SEMATECH. Some observers have noted correctly that part of this
turnaround is due to the 1986 U.S. -Japanese trade agreement (renewed in 1991) to
hamper competition from Japanese chip producers. However, the major success for
U.S. firms has not been in these low-profit-margin chips in which competition has
been restricted. Indeed, the major U.S. success has been in proprietary
microcomponents that use semiconductors as an input. This success is all the more
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striking because the 1986 trade agreement substantially raised the cost of this input.
So none of the U.S. success in proprietary microcomponents can be attributed to the
1986 agreement. What then was responsible for the U.S. success in proprietary
microcomponents? Certainly not SEMATECH because of the lag noted above. The
most likely cause of the U.S. success is the stepped up enforcement of property rights
in intellectual products.
U.S. semiconductor manufacturers (presently) enjoy increased profitability as
the industry continues to shift attention away from commodity products toward
higher margined proprietary products. The establishment of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Washington, D.C. by Congress in 1982
cleared the way for the development of proprietary chip designs. The court was
specifically designed to hear patent cases. (Standard and Poor's, p. El 5)
Prior to 1982, patents were successfully challenged at a rate of 70 percent. After
1982, patents in the United States have been more vigorously enforced. The incentive
after 1982 to produce proprietary products increased. As a result, American firms
dominated proprietary microcomponents; this was prior to the 1986 trade agreement,
and before SEMATECH started. Intel Corporation, for example, specializes in
proprietary microcomponents. Intel has led the resurgence of the American industry
and is currently the number one chip maker in the world. (Standard and Poor's
Industry Surveys, "Electronics Current Analysis") Figure 15 shows the top suppliers
of microcomponents. Figure 16 shows growth of the top microcomponent firms.
Note that the American companies in this market had uniformly double-digit growth
compared to the top foreign companies.
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Figure 15: U.S. companies currently hold a 59 percent microcomponent-market share.
Intel alone had a 29 percent market share in 1992.
SOURCE: Standard and Poor "s Industry Surveys.
There is no question that
the American semiconductor
industry has made a comeback,
led by Intel. The hallmark of
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cost less than two dollars to manufacture in 1988. Intel sold those chips for $300
wholesale, a markup of 1500 percent. (Gilder, Microcosm, p. 183) These and similar
leading edge products blazed the trail for current American success in the
semiconductor industry. These products all took considerable research, development,
testing and evaluation (RDT&E). Coupled with that innovation were the necessary
restructuring and manufacturing improvement programs initiated by companies that
suffered through difficult years in the mid-1980s. The SEMATECH consortium is
not old enough to have played a part in these innovations. SEMATECH initially
concentrated on memory chip production. The American industry ignored this and
instead concentrated on microcomponents. SEMATECH soon followed suit and
abandoned memory chip production. It developed new missions and objectives in
1990. Concentration on proprietary products and industry restructuring are the
reasons for the industry turnaround.
SEMATECH has made positive contributions. SEMATECH has complemented
the American semiconductor industry restructuring and "right sizing" with its Total
Quality Management (TQM) program, its emphasis on computer integrated
manufacturing (CIM), and overall process improvement programs (though not to the
Harris Corporation's satisfaction). SEMATECH has also emphasized improving the
supplier infrastructure. It has done this by funding selected American companies in
different research efforts to preserve and revive the U.S. technology pool.
SEMATECH's assistance to equipment suppliers is premised on the "food chain"
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theory: non-competitiveness in the equipment industry leads to non-competitiveness
"up the food chain" in the chip industry.
This is interesting because Craig Fields, former DARPA director, was
dismissed for providing Gazelle Microelectronics $4 million. Gazelle needed a capital
infusion to stay in business and prevent direct foreign investment. Fields was eased
out of office because the Bush administration opposed interventionist industrial
policies. (Zieglar, 1992, pp. 175-176) In other words, it was improper for DARPA
to intervene in industry, but it was acceptable for SEMATECH to invest in suppliers.
SEMATECH also showed that it was no better than general government
experience in picking industry winners. SEMATECH pumped more than $70 million
into GCA Corporation of Massachusetts to re-establish it as a technology leader in
photolithography. This would contribute to the SEMATECH headliner, the 0.35
micron chip producing machine (a micron is one-one millionth of a meter). Due to
its development of the 0.35 micron etching machine, GCA was a SEMATECH
success story. An American company appeared ready to take the lead in an area
dominated by Nikon and Canon of Japan. However, the fruits of this development
would not be realized for several years. Despite its recent R&D success, GCA was
sold in May 1993, by its parent company General Signal Corporation due to the
continual losses posted by GCA and its inability to crack a Japanese dominated
market. ("SEMATECH-Backed Firm Near Failure," 30 April 1993, p. 1G)
SEMATECH has had little to do with the semiconductor industry's success.
Even if its investments in long term technology pay off, its role in the recent
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turnaround has been negligible. Many believe that SEMATECH has hindered
developments in chip making by supporting older, more-established, billion-dollar
giants over innovative newcomers. SEMATECH attempts to pick winners and losers
in the semiconductor industry. SEMATECH has shown that even as insiders, it's
difficult to pick winners and losers in business. As Brink Lindsey puts it, "...the
bureaucrats have backed the wrong horse. Within the sunrise industry of
microelectronics, the government has managed to locate and subsidize the sunset
companies, to the detriment of those young and dynamic companies that represent the
industry's future." (Lindsey, Feb 1992, p. 48)
B. THE FUTURE OF SEMATECH
The success or failure of SEMATECH is difficult to determine. One thing is
certain, SEMATECH is not a consortium. It seems to be a government-industry
partnership that attempts to please as many constituents as possible by spreading its
budget throughout the United States. It has funded projects in approximately 30 states
involving over 200 sites.
The budget of an individual project determines whether it is part of the
technology pork barrel. The relevant budgeting threshold is when projects
become pobtically relevant on expenditure grounds to a sufficient number of
politicians, or to sufficiently important politicians (such as committee chairs or
other legislators with important responsibilities in Congress). (Cohen and Noll,
1991, p. 381)
The point is that SEMATECH is not a consortium and should not be portrayed as
such. T. J. Rogers, CEO of Cypress Semiconductor, and an outspoken critic of
SEMATECH said, "(SEMATECH) equates the health of our industry with the
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Figure 17: This shows where SEMATECH funds are spread throughout the country.
SOURCE: SEMATECH Success.
fortunes of a handful of giant companies, some of which are models we should avoid
foliowing--the companies that lost market share to the Japanese to begin with."
(Rogers, 23 Jul 1991)
SEMATECH is not a good model for government-industry partnerships. This is
due mainly to four reasons: (1) SEMATECH has an indefinite future; (2)
SEMATECH has no concrete goals or objectives; (3) SEMATECH depends on grants
rather than loans; and (4) SEMATECH has little incentive to maximize potential
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benefit of those tax dollars. Worst of all, SEMATECH further promotes and
encourages special interests to seek out the same type of government funding and
support for their industry.
Research and Development programs seldom have an immediate impact on any
industry. Effects of R&D are typically long-term. Additionally, SEMATECH has
made it clear that preservation of the American vertical infrastructure is a priority.
Reshaping and restructuring the semiconductor infrastructure into a viable, self-
sufficient entity seem inconceivable in five short years.
As for the future, SEMATECH is at the forefront of American industrial policy
and will likely continue to be funded at least through 1997. Dual-use technologies are
now the watch-word for DoD funded R&D. [NOTE: Dual-use means that the
technology is applicable to both military and commercial sectors.] This is a marked
turnaround from the noninterventionist policies of past administrations. Sales of
semiconductors was expected to grow at a nominal eight percent rate through the turn
of the century. Sales actually grew by a nominal rate of 17 percent for 1992.
(Standard and Poor's Industry Surveys) The expected growth, the recent recovery of
American semiconductor manufacturers, and the latitude of funding by SEMATECH
have won support for SEMATECH in Congress and other arenas. Additionally, it is
highly unlikely that SEMATECH will fail in attaining its objectives.
SEMATECH is firmly entrenched in current public policy and will most likely
continue to receive federal support.
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V. SEMATECH AND POLITICS
Politics and SEMATECH cannot help being intimately related, not only because
SEMATECH receives federal funding, but because of the current emphasis on
industrial policy and "dual-use" defense technologies. The defense budget is
shrinking and U.S. defense research and development is being restructured in light of
changing defense requirements, but funding for RDT&E remains relatively constant.
(Nunno, 20 Aug 1992, p. CRS-2) Thus, the Department of Defense remains a
potpourri of available funding to R&D.
This chapter discusses the defense industrial base and whether the government is
responsible for maintaining that infrastructure. It then examines why SEMATECH is
sponsored by DoD through ARPA. If there is so much emphasis on basic or pre-
competitive R&D and dual use technology, why is SEMATECH administered by
DoD? Is this in DoD's best interest? This chapter will conclude with an analysis of
DoD's responsibility to industry.
A. THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
The defense industrial base is a tremendous vertical infrastructure of
manufacturers and suppliers fulfilling all of DoD's procurement and service needs.
Considering the ever-increasing globalization of the worldwide manufacturing base,
many in this country perceive that foreign defense procurement erodes the domestic
capability to provide those items. This perception was illuminated in the early 1980s
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by a Congressional study that showed how many parts on an F- 16 fighter, for
example, were produced overseas. This issue received much attention because of the
potential impact that the cessation of overseas procurement might have on our military
technological advantages.
After Japan began to dominate commodity-type memory chip production in the
1980s, it competed virtually all American DRAM producers out of the DRAM
business. DRAMs and integrated circuits are the backbone of U.S. high-tech
arsenals. This foreign dependence on memory chips is what prompted lobbyists from
the semiconductor industry to seek out and receive increased government subsidies.
In particular, it was the basis upon which SEMATECH was founded. Justification for
this federal assistance was to maintain the "semiconductor defense industrial base."
This "save our defense industrial base" mentality permeates all sectors of
American industries that are losing ground to foreign competition. Many are looking
for federal support to protect their niche even though they provide more expensive,
and in some cases lower quality, products than those available on the world market.
"In the interests of national security" are some of the sweetest words to an American
company specializing in defense-type products. It means that the government will pay
its price. It means it is likely it will maintain a large contract. It also means that its
production will be owned by Americans and located on American soil.
This mentality is certainly not valid in the commercial market. In almost all
cases, the commercial market is a world market with global competition. This
ensures the best valued product to the consumer. With unyielding support for the
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defense industrial base, DoD is cheated by not being able to procure products with the
best value. Benjamin Zycher wrote:
Many people worry that foreign procurement makes the United States vulnerable
to a cutoff in items supplied by foreigners. They fear that cuts in foreign
supplies may exceed, in both number and variety, potential cuts in supplies from
domestic firms. That view is misguided. Suppose that some defense good is
purchased from foreign suppliers and that this arrangement is subject to easy but
unpredictable cutoffs. Suppose, also, that such interruptions are easy to insure
against (with stockpiles, alternative suppliers in other parts of the world, or
excess production capacity in the United States). If so, then foreign dependence
does not cause true vulnerability. The key question, therefore, is not the source
of the defense goods, but rather the ease with which interruptions in supply-
either foreign or domestic—can be insured against. If domestic dependence is
more difficult to insure against than foreign dependence, then ironically,
domestic dependence causes greater vulnerability. (Zycher, 1993, p. 693)
Granted, there are cases in which national security is an issue, but those exist
only in the most top-secret or black programs. Black programs may initially require
sole-source procurement to assure secrecy. Black programs are exempt from market
realities with regards to contractors and funding. In many cases, their preservation is
justified as being in the best interest of the United States. Yet, domestic production is
not truly required for all black program components; for example, a black project
may use foreign semiconductors as long as their use is not specified. This is likely
the scenario in many black projects.
The idea of maintaining the defense industrial base in the interests of national
security is dubious. It is largely promoted by companies that are unable to effectively
compete globally. Aaron Friedberg wrote:
Of all the industrialized nations, defense planners in the United States have
agonized most in recent years over how to deal with the globalization trend.
For much of the half century after 1945, the United States was able to enjoy a
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position of virtual autonomy in defense production. The sheer size and relative
technological sophistication of the U.S. economy make it possible to efficiently
produce almost everything necessary for defense. And this result, so reassuring
from the point of view of military security, was achieved without extensive
government efforts to plan and manage the nation's economy. (Friedberg, 1992,
p. 69)
Nothing stays the same; the world economy has changed.
Never once in our history has our military effectiveness been compromised
because crucial parts or services have been denied by foreign producers. (Moore,
G.D.) Major military confrontations in the last two decades have been swift and
decisive. As in other conflicts, the Desert Storm effort relied primarily on inventories
for spare parts. American industry began to respond to demands placed on them by
the military in the Persian Gulf. When called, industry largely satisfied the need.
The idea that the defense industrial base is at risk is a myth that is largely perpetuated
by organizations such as the Semiconductor Industry Association (SLA) and other
special interest groups, that have convinced our legislators to subsidize them in order
to preserve their companies. The "defense industrial base" has been entrenched in
our vocabulary as can be seen by the complex web of defense R&D funding through
the Department of Defense Technology Base Program. Defense protectionism was
once the policy, albeit an inefficient one, when American industry's ability to support
sudden and sustained increases in military production could potentially prove decisive
in defeating the Soviet Union. That global threat has subsided and defense
protectionism should die with it.
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Overtly preserving the "defense industrial base" limits DoD in its ability to be a
market consumer. With declining budgets and a shrinking military, DoD must
demand value in all appropriations and expenditures. DoD must act and be treated
like a free-market consumer.
B. DOD AND SEMATECH
SEMATECH is sponsored by DoD through ARPA. The diminishing domestic
memory market and the woes of American semiconductor manufacturers enabled the
SLA to effectively lobby for SEMATECH in the name of national defense. The
objective was to prevent the memory-industrial base from shifting overseas.
SEMATECH' s focus has evolved. * For SEMATECH to remain in legislative favor
and justify funding, its new battle cry is preserving the industrial infrastructure and
keeping jobs in this country. In all its public relations literature, SEMATECH
emphasizes these ideas so much that the literature reads like propaganda.
SEMATECH 's national security connections are given limited emphasis. In
SEMATECH Accomplishments (1992), SEMATECH's direct contributions to the DoD
are not explicitly noted. Instead, the different military systems that include products
manufactured by SEMATECH-member companies are noted. Upon quick review, it
would appear that SEMATECH is responsible for those contributions.
It's not entirely clear that SEMATECH's interests are in defense. It seems
more probable the SEMATECH is interested in keeping its yearly $100 million
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government grants. So the question is, if SEMATECH is to continue receiving
federal funds, why are those funds syphoned from DoD?
In 1987, when SEMATECH was initiated, there was strong sentiment that it
was a commercial venture and that government support should not be channelled
through DoD and DARPA.
SEMATECH is being conducted under cover of national defense, rather than
economic necessity, which handicaps it from the start. What the military often
wants in a semiconductor chip (unsurpassed performance under conditions of
conflict) is not what civilian industry needs (reliability and low cost).
(Dertouzos, 1990, p. 10)
This general feeling raises an important point. DoD's and commerce's interests n
semiconductor technology are not entirely compatible. DoD may benefit from chips
with those properties desired in the civilian market, but the commercial market is not
interested in paying the added costs for DoD-demanded durability. The departure of
Harris Corporation from SEMATECH further illustrates this incompatibility. Harris
has been the military's number one supplier of semiconductors for several years.
(Standard and Poor's)
SEMATECH is funded by DoD because the Department of Defense has the
single largest federal RDT&E budget, $38 billion. (Nunno, 20 aug 1992, p. CRS-3)
ARPA accounts for 22 percent of that budget. Department of Defense RDT&E is
totally discretionary funding that is earmarked for high-risk technology. (Davey, 21
Apr 1988, p. CRS-73) SEMATECH currently concentrates on management and the
manufacturing process; these are not high risk technologies that promote quantum
79
US RDT&E Public & Private Spending







Figure 18: DoD Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation Budget.
SOURCE: Mouff, J.D., "Research and Development Funding: FY 1993,* CRS Issue Brief, 13 Aug 92, p. 1.
technology advancement. Management and processes are contrary to the doctrine of
ARPA. SEMATECH is part of the DoD because DARPA was the venue through
which SEMATECH could obtain funding.
ARPA's mission is shifting from solely DoD interests to dual technology. Dual
technology is designed to promote both civilian and military benefits. For ARPA to
remain a part of the DoD is a question that will not be addressed here. According to
Michele Higdon, SEMATECH is part of the DoD because the Semiconductor Industry
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Association and Robert Noyce were able to "work the system." They knew how to
win Congressional support. (Higdon)
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VI. CONCLUSION
DoD is not responsible for funding industrial R&D. Instead, DoD is
responsible for supporting requirements and specifications for systems and products
that serve defense needs today and in the future. Further, DoD's responsibility is to
select bids that best satisfy those needs. DoD may have to fund some R&D in
conjunction with these products. Only in this manner will DoD receive the best
product for its money and at the same time promote a free market by ensuring keen
competition within industry. If the federal government decides to support commercial
R&D, it should do so explicitly. Industrial R&D should not be disguised as a
national security issue.
Several conclusions result from this thesis. First, SEMATECH is not
responsible for the semiconductor industry's regaining market share. Second,
SEMATECH is neither an effective nor efficient model for government-industry
partnership. Finally, federal support for SEMATECH should cease.
A. SEMATECH IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SEMICONDUCTOR
INDUSTRY'S REGAINING MARKET SHARE.
The American semiconductor industry recently regained market share due to its
specialization and innovations. U.S. chip makers are more interested in producing
high-profit-margin products and purchasing low-profit-margin commodity-type-
products overseas. This quest for specialized production requires innovation. The
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demand for innovation to insure profitability is a tremendous incentive for U.S.
semiconductor firms to invest in research and development. Innovative products are
what created the market niches that spurned the recent industry turnaround. The
semiconductor industry's recovery coincided with the SEMATECH's formation
merely by chance. This is not to say that SEMATECH is a success or failure.
Rather, it is to say that SEMATECH did not cause the U.S. semiconductor industry
to regain market share. There is an inherent time factor in getting RDT&E products
to market. After only five years, SEMATECH's R&D success cannot yet be
determined. SEMATECH proponents could argue that SEMATECH concentrates
more on the manufacturing process than product development, and that results from
SEMATECH research in "process improvement" are already felt throughout the
American semiconductor industry. {SEMATECH Success) If this were true, Harris
Corporation would not have resigned from the consortium. (Blanc) The American
semiconductor industry regained market share with superior, innovative products.
These products were not influenced by SEMATECH.
B. SEMATECH IS NEITHER AN EFFECTIVE NOR EFFICIENT MODEL
FOR GOVERNMENT-INDUSTRY PARTNERSHIP.
SEMATECH is not a model to be emulated. It is an improper model because
SEMATECH is a self-perpetuating organization. SEMATECH is a stand-alone
organization with impressive lobbying ability. SEMATECH has yet to declare
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concrete objectives. SEMATECH is funded through the Department of Defense, but
it seems to put little emphasis on defense.
Future government-industry partnerships cannot create independent associations.
Future government-sponsored consortia must have definitive objectives that must be
completed within a specified time. SEMATECH was said to be modeled after
Japanese research and development consortia. If that were true, SEMATECH would
have disbanded, and the billion dollar members would repay the $700 million loan.
Instead, SEMATECH is more similar to Europe's JESSI, a permanent organization
hoping for funding through this century.
Since SEMATECH's inception in 1987, it has not brought in a single new
member. Worse, SEMATECH lost three founding members, one being the leading
supplier of DoD semiconductors. SEMATECH seems content with its current
membership and discourages additional membership by insisting that its initiation fees
be cost-prohibitive for a new member to join.
Being a stand-alone organization, SEMATECH has gained strength over time,
perpetuating its life. SEMATECH "success" is the epitome of industrial policy. But,
it's difficult to determine the success of SEMATECH. The only thing that is assured
is that SEMATECH will continue lobbying for it's annual grant.
A "SEMATECH-type" organization is not the proper model for future
government-industry ventures. A better model would be the similar to the Japanese'
VLSI model. Government-industry partnerships must have definite objectives that
must be accomplished within a pre-determined period. To complete those objectives,
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the partnership must rely on the existing infrastructure rather than forming a "stand-
alone" organization. The policy of low-interest loans seems more appealing than
government grants or subsidies.
C. FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR SEMATECH SHOULD CEASE.
To remain competitive in today's market, even the giants of the semiconductor
industry have established numerous joint ventures with overseas partners or
conglomerates. Spillovers from research and development in the semiconductor
industry cannot be prevented. These spillovers of technology from SEMATECH
member firms to foreign competitors are indirectly funded by American taxpayers.
SEMATECH should not continue receiving government funds. SEMATECH has not
invigorated chip making as it was initially designed, nor is SEMATECH the solution
for government involvement with private industry. It is unlikely that SEMATECH
will return the annual $100 million worth of benefit to the taxpaying public.
SEMATECH is an excellent example of good intentions and effort applied in a
fundamentally flawed manner. Although it is difficult to determine who owns
SEMATECH' s current assets, if SEMATECH is to continue, it should be privately
funded. The bottom line is that federal funding for SEMATECH should cease.
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VH. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
Government-industry relations, industrial policy, consortia, the semiconductor
industry are all very interesting topics. There are a number of areas for further study
resulting from this thesis:
• If funds to SEMATECH cease, what happens to the organization?
• Does the Department of Defense have a responsibility to develop "dual-use"
technology?
• Must the Department of Defense maintain the defense industrial base? If so,
what is the best method to insure its preservation?
• What is the best model of government-industry partnerships?
• How can the government best determine the key industries to support?
• Does American research and development rely too heavily on federal subsidies?
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